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1 Introduction to Backdoors in Deep Neural Networks
Intuitively, a backdoor attack against Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) is to inject
hidden malicious behaviors into DNNs such that the backdoor model behaves legiti-
mately for benign inputs, yet invokes a predefined malicious behavior when its input
contains a malicious trigger. The trigger can take a plethora of forms, including a
special object present in the image (e.g., a yellow pad), a shape filled with custom
textures (e.g., logos with particular colors) or even image-wide stylizations with spe-
cial filters (e.g., images altered by Nashville or Gotham filters). These filters can be
applied to the original image by replacing or perturbing a set of image pixels.
Formally, for a given benign modelF :X 7→Y , for a selected malicious output
prediction result (the predefined malicious behavior) R, a backdoor attack is to gener-
ate: 1) a backdoor model G :X 7→Y , 2) a backdoor trigger generatorT :X 7→X ,
which alters a benign input to a malicious input such that:
G (x) =
{
F (x), if x ∈ {X −T (X )}
R, if x ∈T (X ).
A brief overview of the works discussed in this chapter is summarized in Table 1.
2 Backdoor Attacks
The recent years have observed an explosive increase in the applications of deep
learning. Deep neural networks have been proven to outperform both traditional ma-
chine learning techniques and humans cognitive capacity in many domains. Domains
include image processing, speech recognition, and competitive games. Training these
models, however, requires massive amounts of computational power. Therefore, to
∗The authors are listed in alphabetical order.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
08
27
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
6 J
ul 
20
20
2 Shaofeng Li, Shiqing Ma, Minhui Xue, Benjamin Zi Hao Zhao
cater to the growing demands of machine learning, technology giants have intro-
duced Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) [44], a new service delivered through
cloud platforms. Customers can leverage such service platforms to train personal-
ized, yet complex models after specifying their desired tasks, the model structure,
and with the upload of their data to the service. Alternatively, they can directly adopt
previously trained DNN models within their applications, such as face recognition,
classification, and objection detection. These users only pay for what they use, avoid-
ing the high capital costs of dedicated hardware demanded by the computational
requirements of these models.
However, there is little transparency of the training process of models produced
by MLaaS or pre-trained models open-sourced on Internet. It is possible these models
may have been compromised by Backdoor Attacks [15, 30], which are aimed at
fooling the model with pre-mediated inputs. Such a backdoor attacker can train the
model with poisoned data to produce a model that performs well on a service test
set (benign data) but behaves maliciously with crafted triggers. A malicious MLaaS
can covertly launch backdoor attacks by providing clients with models poisoned with
backdoors.
2.1 Threat Model
Consider an example scenario of a company deploying a facial-recognition as part of
their resource access control system; the company may choose to use MLaaS for the
deployment of the biometrics-based system. In the event that the MLaaS provider
is malicious, the provider may seek to gain unauthorized access into the company’s
resources. It then can train a model that recognizes faces correctly in the typical use
case of authenticating a legitimate employee of the company, diffusing any suspicion
Table 1. A summary of the literature of backdoor attacks ( indicates the usage of datasets)
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Attacks
[15] Using a single pixel and pattern pixel as the trigger to conduct backdoor attacks   
[29] Generating triggers via optimization to amplify specific neural activations  
[8] Adding poisoning samples into the training dataset, without directly accessing the victim learning system  
[12] Injecting a backdoor into a CNN model by perturbing its weights   
[25] Invisible trigger patterns through iterative search of the dataset    
[4, 5, 39, 48] Poisoning training sets without altering labels   
[45] Using indistinguishable latent representation for benign and adversarial data points to bypass backdoor detection   
[3, 52] Backdoor attacks against federated learning    
[55] Backdoor attacks against transfer learning    
[20] Backdoor attacks against speech recognition models
[32] Backdoor attacks against unsupervised template updating
[53] Intentional backdoor attacks against sequential models
[21] Weight Poisoning Attacks on Pretrained Models
Detection and Mitigation
No Inspections [27, 54, 56] Compressing the model (e.g. pruning or fine-tune)    
Pre-Deployment
[49] Detecting backdoors via reverse engineering of triggers and outlier detection    
[47, 46] Statistical analysis to capture subtle changes on data distributions caused by adding triggers     
[28] Scanning every neuron of a given DNN model     
[16] Improving Neural Cleanse [49] through additional regularization   
[19] Training a model-based classifier to identify the backdoored models    
Post-Deployment
[7] Analyzing the neuron activations to the training data to determine whether it has been poisoned    
[13] Relying on the “image-agnostic” characteristic to detect backdoor attacks   
Beneficial uses of Backdoors
[1, 23] Watermarking DNNs by backdooring
[43] Trapdoors for adversarial attacks via backdoor
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the company may have about the MLaaS provider. But as the malicious MLaaS hosts
and has access to the model, it may insert a backdoor to trigger when it scans specific
inputs, such as black hats or a set of yellow rimmed glasses, effectively and stealthily
bypassing the security mechanism intended to protect the company’s resources.
There are two ways to create backdoored DNN models. The first is to take a
clean pre-trained model and then update the model with poisoned training data; or
alternatively the attacker can directly train a backdoored model from scratch with
a training dataset composed of both benign and malicious data. The latter attack,
however, will need access the full original train dataset, While the former attacker
will only need a small set of clean training data for retraining.
In regards to the attackers capability, there are three types of threat model, white-
box, grey-box, and black-box attack settings.
2.2 White-Box Setting
A white-box attack setting provides an attacker with the strongest attack assump-
tions. The attackers have full access to the target DNN models and full access to the
training set.
BadNets. Gu et al. [15] propose BadNets which injects a backdoor by poisoning the
training set. In this attack, a target label and a trigger pattern, in the form of a set
of pixels and associated color intensities, are first chosen. Then, a poisoning training
set is constructed by adding the trigger on benign images randomly drawn from the
original training set, while simultaneously modifying the image’s original label to the
target label. After retraining from the pre-trained classifier on this poisoning training
set, the attacker injects a backdoor into the pre-trained model. Gu et al.’s experiments
provide insights into how the backdoor attack operates and test the extreme scenario
where the trigger is only a single pixel. Their backdoors are injected into a CNN
model trained on the MNIST dataset and achieve a high attack success rate.
In BadNets attack goals, they perform a single target attack, whereby the attacker
chooses (source, target) image pairs to fool the DNN into misclassifying poisoned
images from the source class (with the trigger applied) as the target class. We shall
call this type of attack a “partial backdoor”. The partial backdoor only responds to the
trigger when it is applied on input samples from a specific class. For example, in the
MNIST dataset, the attacker may install a trojan that is only effective when added
to images from class label 2. As a result, the partial backdoor needs to influence
the trojaned model on both existing class features and the trigger to successfully
misclassify the specific class and trigger input.
Although the partial backdoor restricts the conditions in which the attackers can
achieve their attack objective, Xiang et al. [51] note that this type of attack strat-
egy can evade the backdoor detection methods [49, 13] which assume the trigger
is the input agnostic for all classes. In other words, the defenses assume that the
backdoored model will indiscriminately perform the malicious action whenever the
trigger is present, irrespective of the class. Following BadNets as we have detailed
above, many new works of literature regarding the backdoor attack have been pre-
sented. To name a few, Dumford and Scheirer [12] inject a backdoor into a CNN
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model by perturbing its weights; Tan and Shokri [45] use indistinguishable latent
representation for benign and adversarial data points via regularization to bypass the
backdoor detection.
Clean Label. Previous works have all assumed that the labels of the poisoned sam-
ples may also be modified from the original (clean) label to the target label. However,
this change greatly hurts the stealthiness of the attack, as a human inspector would
easily identify an inconsistency between the contents of the poisoned samples and
their labels. Particularly in some security-critical scenarios, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the dataset is checked by first pre-processing the data to identify outliers.
This could be manually inspected by a human.
Marni et al. [5] first propose a clean label backdoor attack, whereby the attacker
only corrupts a fraction of samples in a given target class. Therefore, in this setting,
the attacker does not need to change the labels of the corrupted samples. However,
this incurs a penalty as the attacker needs to corrupt a larger portion of training sam-
ples. In their experiments, the minimum poisoning rate of the target class training
samples had to exceed 30%; to achieve a sufficient attack success rate this value
exceeded 40%. Turner et al. [48] also consider this setting, and prove that when re-
stricting the adversary to only poison a small proportion of samples in the target
class (less than 25%), the attack becomes virtually ineffective. Turner et al. reason
that this observation, as a result of poisoned samples from the target class, contains
enough information for the classifier to identify the samples as the target class cor-
rectly without the influence of trigger patterns. Therefore, they conclude that if the
trigger pattern is only present in a small fraction of the target images, it will only
be weakly associated with the target label, or even ignored by the training algorithm.
Consequently, Turner et al. create a type of poisoned sample in which the association
between the trigger pattern and the target label is sufficiently strong to override the
influence of features from the original image target class.
In [48], Turner et al. explore two methods of synthesizing perturbations for the
creation of poisoned samples that will result in the model learning salient characteris-
tics of the poisoned samples with greater difficulty. This increased learning difficulty
forces the model to rely more heavily on the backdoor pattern to make a correct
prediction, successfully introducing a backdoor. In their first method, A Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN) [14] embeds the distribution of the training data into
a latent space. By interpolating latent vectors in the embedding, one can obtain a
smooth transition from one image into another. To this end, they first train a GAN
on the training set and have a generator G : Rd → Rn. Then given a vector z in
the d-dimensional latent vector generator, G will generate an image G (z) in the n-
dimensional pixel space. Secondly, they optimize over the latent space to find the
optimal reconstruction encoding that produces an image most close to the target im-
age x in l2 distance. Formally, the optimal reconstruction encoding of a target image
x using G is
EG (x) = argmin
z∈Rd
||x−G (z)||2.
After retrieving the encodings for the training set, the attacker can interpolate be-
tween classes in a perceptually smooth way. Given an constant τ , they define the
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interpolation IG between images x1 and x2 as
IG (x1,x2,τ) = G (τz1+(1− τ)z2), where z1 = EG (x1), z2 = EG (x2).
Finally, the attacker searches for a value of τ , large enough to make the salient char-
acteristics of the interpolation image useless, however, small enough to ensure the
content of the interpolation image IG (x1,x2,τ) still agrees with the target label for
humans. In their second approach, Turner et al. apply an adversarial transformation
to each image before they apply the backdoor pattern. The goal is to make these
images harder to classify correctly using standard image features, encouraging the
model to memorize the backdoor pattern as a dominant feature. Formally, given a
fixed classifier C with loss L and input x, they construct the adversarial perturba-
tions as
xadv = argmax
||x′−x||p≤ε
L (x′),
for some lp-norm and bound ε . Now the attacker retrieves a set of untargeted adver-
sarial examples of the target class, and the attacker applies the trigger pattern to these
adversarial examples which resemble the target class. Although both approaches al-
low for poisoning samples with the trigger containing the same label as the base
image, the applied trigger has a visually noticeable shape and size in both types of
clean label backdoor attacks. Thus, the attacker will still need to use a perceptible
trigger pattern to inject and activate the backdoor, potentially compromising the se-
crecy of the attack.
Saha et al. [39] propose a clean label backdoor attack, whereby the attacker hides
the trigger in the poisoned data and maintains secrecy of the trigger until test time.
Saha et al. first define a trigger pattern p with a binary mask m (i.e., 1 at the location
of the patch and 0 everywhere else), then apply the trigger p to a source image si
from the source category. The patched source image s˜i is
s˜i = si (1−m)+ pm,
where  is for element-wise product. After retrieving the poisoned source image,
the attacker solves an optimization problem over an image from the target class as
the poisoned image such that the l2 distance of the patched source image s˜ is close
to the poisoned image z in the feature space, meanwhile the l∞ distance between the
poisoned image and its initial image t is maintained less than a threshold ε . Formally,
the a poisoned image z can be defined as:
argmin
z
|| f (z)− f (s˜)||22
st. ||z− t||∞ < ε,
(1)
where f (·) is the intermediate features of the DNN and ε is a small value that ensures
the poisoned image z to be not visually distinguishable from the initial target image
t. The optimization mentioned above only generates a single poisoned sample given
a pair of images from source and target classes as well as a fixed location for the
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trigger. One can add this poisoned data with the correct label to the training data and
train a backdoor model. However, such a model will only have the backdoor triggered
when the attacker places the trigger at the same location on the same source image,
limiting the practicality of the attack.
To address this shortcoming, Saha et al. [39] propose to manipulate the poisoned
images to be closer to the cluster of patched source images rather than being close
to only the single patched source image. Inspired by universal adversarial exam-
ples [36], Saha et al. [39] minimize the expected value of the loss in Eq. (2) over
all possible trigger locations and source images. In their extension, the attacker first
samplesK random images tk from the target class and initializes poisoned images zk
with tk; second,K random images sk is sampled from the source class and patched
with triggers at randomly chosen locations to obtain s˜k. For a given zk in the poisoned
image set, they search for a ˜sa(k) in the patched image set which is close to zk in the
feature space f (·), as measured by Euclidean distance. Next, the attacker creates a
one-to-one mapping a(k) for the poisoned images set and the patched images set.
Finally, the attacker performs one iteration of mini-batch projected gradient descent
as follows:
argmin
z
K
∑
k=1
|| f (zk)− f ( ˜sa(k))||22
st. ∀k : ||zk− tk||∞ < ε.
(2)
Using the method above, the backdoor trigger samples are given the correct label and
only used at test time.
Hiding Triggers. In the clean label backdoor attacks mentioned above, the attacker
attempts to conduct backdoor attacks without compromising the label of the poisoned
samples. On the other hand, it is desirable to make the trigger patterns indistinguish-
able when mixed with legitimate data in order to evade human inspection.
Liao et al. [25] propose two approaches to make the triggers invisible to human
users. The first type of triggers is a small static perturbation with a simple pattern
built upon empirical observation. As Liao et al. mention in [25], the limitation of this
method is in the increased difficulty for pre-trained models to memorize this type of
features, regardless of content and classification models. Consequently, this method
of triggers hiding is only practical during the training stage, with access to the entire
dataset. The second method to hide the trigger is inspired by the universal adversar-
ial attack [35]. This attack iteratively searches the whole dataset to find the minimal
universal perturbation to push all the data points toward the decision boundary of the
target class. For each data point, to push this data point towards the target decision
boundary, an incremental perturbation ∆vi will be applied. Note that in the second
method, although the smallest perturbation (trigger) can be found by the universal
adversarial search, the method still needs to apply the trigger on the data points to
poison the training set, and retrain the pre-trained model. In their work, the indistin-
guishability of Trojan trigger examples is attained by a magnitude constraint on the
perturbations to craft such examples [31].
Li et al. [24] demonstrate the trade-off between the effectiveness and stealth of
Trojans. Li et al. hide triggers on the input images through steganography and reg-
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ularization. For the first backdoor attack, the adoption of steganography techniques
involves the modification of the least significant bits to embed textual triggers into
the inputs. In Li et al’s regularization approach, they develop an optimization algo-
rithm involving Lp (p = 0,2,∞) regularization to effectively distribute the trigger
throughout the victim image. When compared to trigger patterns used by Saha et
al. [39] that are still visually exposed during the attack phase, the triggers generated
by this attack are invisible for human inspectors during both injection and attack
phase.
Dynamic Backdoor. Dynamic backdooring, as proposed by Salem et al. [40], fea-
tures a technique whereby triggers for a specific target label have dynamic patterns
and locations. This provides attackers with the flexibility for further customizing
their backdoor attacks. Salem et al. use random backdoors to demonstrate a naive
attack, where triggers are sampled from a uniform distribution. These triggers are
then applied to a random location sampled from a set of locations for each input in
the injection stage before training the model. The trained backdoored model will now
output the specific target label when the attacker samples a trigger from the same uni-
form distribution and the location set and adds it to any input. Evolving beyond the
naive attack, Salem et al. construct a backdoor generating network (BaN) to produce
a generative model (similar to the decoder of VAE [37] or generator of GANs [33])
that can transform latent prior distributions (i.e., Gaussian or Uniform distribution)
into triggers. The parameters of this BaN is trained jointly with the backdoor model.
In the joint training process, the loss between the output of the backdoored model
and the ground truth (for the clean input) or the target label (for the poisoned sam-
ples) will be backpropagated not only through the backdoored model for an update,
but also through the BaN. Upon completion of the model training, the BaN will have
learned a map from the latent vector to the triggers that can activate the backdoor
model. Salem et al.’s final technique extends the BaN to C-BaN by incorporating
the target label information as a conditional input. This changes results in inputs
whereby the target label does not need to have its own unique trigger locations, and
the generated triggers for different target labels can appear at any location on the
input.
Distributed Backdoor. In comparison to traditional centralized machine learning
settings, federated learning (FL) mitigates many systemic privacy risks and compu-
tational costs. Therefore, there has been an explosive growth in the amount of fed-
erated learning research. The purpose of backdoor attacks in FL is that an attacker
who controls one or several participant(s) may manipulate their local models to si-
multaneously fit the clean and poisoned training samples. With the aggregation of
local models from participants into a global model at the server, the global model
would have been influenced by the malicious models to behave maliciously on com-
promised inputs. Bagdasaryan et al. [3] are the first to mount a single local attacker
backdoor attack against a FL platform via model replacement. In their attack, the
attacker proposes a target backdoored global modelX they want the server to be in
the next round. Then the attacker scales up his local backdoored model to ensure it
can survive averaging to ensure the global model to be substituted byX .
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On the other hand, Xie et al. [52] propose a distributed backdoor attack (DBA)
which decomposes a global trigger pattern into separate local patterns, and uses these
local patterns to inject into the training sets of different local adversarial participants.
Fig. 1 illustrates the intuition of the DBA. As we can see, the attackers only need
to inject a piece of the global trigger to poison their local models, such that the
collective trigger is learned by the global model. Surprisingly, DBA can use a global
trigger pattern to activate the ultimate global model as well as a centralized attack
does. Xie et al. find that although no singular adversarial party had been poisoned
by the global trigger under DBA, the DBA indeed can still behave malicious as a
centralized attack.
Fig. 1. Intuition of the Distributed Backdoor Attack (DBA) [52]. An attacker with marked
as orange will poison a subset of his training data using only the trigger pattern located at
the orange area. The same reasoning applies to the remaining green, yellow, and blue marked
attackers.
2.3 Grey-Box Setting
A grey-box attack presents a weaker threat model in comparison to white-box at-
tacks. Recall that white-box attackers have full access to the training data or training
process. However, in the grey-box threat model, the attacker’s capability is limited
with access to either a small subset of training data or the learning algorithms.
Poisoning Training datasets. In the former grey-box setting, Chen et al. [8] pro-
pose a backdoor attack which injects a backdoor into DNNs by adding a small set
of poisoned samples into the training dataset, without directly accessing the victim
learning system. Their experiments show that with a single instance (a face-to-face
recognition system) as the backdoor key, it only needs 5 poisoned samples to be
added to a huge (600,000 images) training set. If the trigger is in the form of a pat-
tern (e.g., glasses for facial recognition), 50 poisoned samples are sufficient for a
respectable attack success rate.
Trojaning NN. The grey-box setting, which does not provide the attacker with access
to the training or test data, instead providing full access to the target DNN models, is
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observed in transfer learning pipelines. The attacker only has access to a pre-trained
DNN model, and this setting is more common than the former grey-box assumption
of access to a subset of data. Liu et al’s Trojaning attacker [29] has both a clean
pre-trained model and a small auxiliary dataset generated by reverse engineering
the model. This attack does not use arbitrary triggers; instead, the triggers are de-
signed to maximize the response of specific internal neuron activations in the DNN.
This creates a higher correlation between triggers and internal neurons, by building a
stronger dependence between specific internal neurons and the target labels, retrain-
ing the model with the backdoor requires less training data. Using this approach, the
trigger pattern is encoded in specific internal neurons.
2.4 Black-Box Setting
The prior backdoor threat models assume an attacker capable of compromising either
the training data or the model training environment. Such threats are unlikely in
many common ML use-case scenarios. For example, organizations train on their own
private data, without outsourcing the training computation. On-premise training is
typical in many industries, and the resulting models are deployed internally with a
focus on fast iterations. Collecting training data, training a model, and deploying it
are all parts of a continuous, automated production pipeline that is accessed only by
trusted administrators, without the potential of incorporating malicious third parties.
Compromising Code. Bagdasaryan and Shmatikov [2] propose a code-only back-
door attack in which the adversary does not need to access the training data or the
training process directly. Yet, that attack still produces a backdoored model by adding
malicious code to ML codebases that are built with complex control logic and dozens
of thousands of code blocks. The key to their method lies in the following assump-
tion: compromising code in ML codebases stealthily is realistic, as it is reasonable
for most of the cases that correctness tests of ML codebases are not available. For ex-
ample, the three most popular PyTorch repositories on GitHub, fairseq, transformers
and fasta˙i, all include multiple loss computations and complex model architectures.
The attack will remain unnoticed under unit testing when the adversaries add a new
backdoor loss function unified with other conventional losses, as the intention of
this malicious loss (and backdoor attacks as a whole) is to preserve normal training
behavior.
Specifically, they model backdoor attacks through the lens of multi-objective
optimization (w.r.t. multiple loss functions). The loss for the main task m should
perform regularly during training; however the backdoor loss is computed on the
poisoned samples that are synthesized by the adversary’s code. The two losses are
then unified into one overall loss through a linear operation. The authors solve
their multi-objective optimization problem via Multiple Gradient Descent Algorithm
(MGDA) [11].
Live Trojan. Costales et al. [9] propose a live backdoor attack which patches model
parameters in system memory to achieve the desired malicious backdoor behavior.
The attack setting assumes that the attacker has the capability to modify data in
the victim process’s address space (/proc/[PID]/map, /proc/[PID]/mem). Countless
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possibilities exist to enable this power. For example, trojaning a system library, or
remapping memory between processes with a malicious kernel module, which has
been proved effective in Stuxnet [22]. After the attacker establishes write capabili-
ties in the relevant address space, they need to find the weights of the DNN stored
in memory. The proposal suggests either Binwalk [17] or Volatility [26] to find sig-
natures of the networks by detecting a large swaths of binary storing weights. Once
the malware has scanned the memory and the weights of DNNs located, masked
retraining is used to modify only the selected parameters which are the most sig-
nificant neurons of the DNNs to perform as the backdoor behavior. In identifying
the parameters of the model which will yield a high attack success rate, the attacker
will compute the average gradient for a continuous subset of parameters on one layer
with a window size across the entire poisoned dataset. Parameter values with larger
absolute average value gradients indicate that the model would likely benefit from
modifying the parameter value. After calculating the patches, simple scripts will load
the patched weights into binary files to which the malware can apply.
Although this attack needs knowledge of the DNN’s architecture, it is possible
for an attacker to take a snapshot of the victim’s system, extract the system image,
and use forensic and/or reverse-engineering tools to achieve this indirectly and run
code on the victim system. As such, we categorize this type of backdoor attacks as a
black-box attack.
3 Detecting and Defending Backdoors
Attacks from white- to black-box settings have been developed with the goal of sub-
verting the machine learning model to include backdoored behavior. However, any
model trainer, or holder may take proactive steps to detect and defend their mod-
els against this threat. This section will describe at length how this attack may be
thwarted. Overall, the task of detecting and defending against a backdoor attack can
be divided into three key sub-tasks:
1. Task 1: Detecting the existence of the backdoor. For a given model, it is difficult
to know if the model is compromised (i.e., a model with a backdoor) or not. The
first step of detecting and defending against the backdoor attack is to analyze the
model and determine if there is a backdoor present in this model.
2. Task 2: Identifying the backdoor trigger. When a backdoor is detected in a
model, the second step is usually to identify which pattern (including its size,
location, texture, and so on) is used as the trigger.
3. Task 3: Mitigating the backdoor attack. After identifying the existence of a
backdoor, the mitigation of such an attack is to remove the backdoor behav-
ior from the model. Note that backdoor models can be made to be robust against
transfer learning or fine-tuning [54].
It is noted that not all detection and defense techniques will support all three
sub-tasks. As some may assume prior knowledge that a backdoor has already been
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detected, and the proposal only contains techniques to recover the trigger or mitigate
the attack.
Fig. 2. Overview of DNN model training and deployment.
Figure 2 shows an overview of the DNN model training and deployment pro-
cess. It can be broken up into four general steps from data preparation, model train-
ing, model testing, and model deployment. As discussed in Section 2, most existing
poisoning attacks target the model training (or model retraining) step. Thus, inves-
tigating if the model contains a backdoor, reconstructing potential triggers, and/or
mitigating any backdoor attacks must occur after this training step. Thus, mitigation
strategies will be employed either during model testing (i.e., pre-deployment) or at
the model’s runtime (i.e., post-deployment). Thus, depending on when the inspection
occurs, existing detection and defense techniques can be divided into two categories:
pre-deployment techniques or post-deployment techniques.
3.1 Pre-deployment Techniques
No Inspections
There exists work [56, 27] attempting to directly mitigate the backdoor attack with-
out inspecting the model behavior. The key technique behind these methods is to
compress the model (e.g., by model pruning or similar techniques) or fine-tune the
model with benign inputs to alter the model behavior hoping that the backdoor behav-
ior is eliminated. Specifically, Zhao et al. [56] found that model pruning can remove
some behaviors of a trained model, and potentially it can remove the backdoor of the
model if pruning is purely using benign data.
Liu et al. [27] observe that pruning the model alone does not guarantee the re-
moval of the model backdoor behavior. This is because the malicious model may
use the same neuron to demonstrate both benign and malicious behaviors. Thus, if
the neuron is removed, the model accuracy will be lower than that of the original
model. This would be an undesirable consequence even though the model backdoor
is removed. However, if this neuron is not pruned, the backdoor behavior is retained
and the model continues to be malicious, also undesirable. Similarly, fine-tuning the
model does not necessarily remove the model backdoor, as some attacks [54] target
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transfer learning scenarios where fine-tuning is needed. To solve this problem, Yao
et al. propose Fine-Pruning, which combines the strengths of both fine-tuning and
pruning to effectively nullify backdoors in DNN models. Fine-Pruning first removes
backdoor neurons using pruning and fine-tuning the model in order to restore the
drop in classification accuracy on clean inputs (which is introduced in the previous
pruning procedure).
There are some limitations of these types of defenses. Firstly, model pruning
itself has unknown effects on the model. Even though model accuracy after prun-
ing does not decrease too much, many other important model properties, such as
model bias (sometimes known as fairness) and model prediction performance, are
not guaranteed to be the same. Using such models may potentially lead to severe
consequences. Secondly, these mitigation techniques assume the access to the train-
ing process and clean inputs, which conflicts with poisoning-based attacks.
Pre-deployment Model Inspections
Before the model is deployed, it is possible to check whether the model has been
backdoored directly. This kind of strategy works without the running of the model,
so it is also called static detection. For these types of techniques, some will require a
large set of benign inputs to identify backdoors, such as Neural Cleanse (NC) [49],
whereas others do not require much data (i.e., a limited number or even zero sam-
ples), such as ABS [28].
Fig. 3. Intuition of NC [49].
Neural Cleanse. Wang et al. [49] propose Neural Cleanse (NC), a pre-deployment
technique to inspect DNNs, identify backdoors, and mitigate such attacks. Figure 3
illustrates the key observation that enables NC. The top figure shows a clean model
with three output labels. If we want to perturb inputs belonging to C to A, more
modification is needed to move samples across decision boundaries. The bottom
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figure shows the infected model, where the backdoor changes decision boundaries
leading to a small perturbation value for changing inputs belonging to B and C to A.
Based on this observation, NC proposes to first compute a universal perturbation,
which is the minimized amount of change to make the model predict a given target
label. If the perturbation is small enough (i.e., smaller than a given threshold), NC
considers it as one trigger. It then verifies this by adding this trigger to a large number
of benign inputs and tests if it is really a trigger and tries to optimize it based on
prediction results. After identifying the trigger, it can mitigate the attack by either
using a filter (i.e., to detect images with such a trigger pattern) or patching the DNN
by removing the corresponding behaviors by pruning the neural network.
NC has a number of limitations. First, NC makes an incorrect assumption that if
pixels in a small region have a strong influence on the output result, they are treated
as backdoor triggers. This results in NC confusing triggers with strong benign fea-
tures. In many tasks, there exist strong local features, where a region of pixels is
important for one output label, for example, the antlers of deers in CIFAR-10. Sec-
ondly, NC assumes that the trigger has to be small and in the corner areas. These
are heuristics, which do not hold for many attacks. For example, Salem et al. [40]
proposes a dynamic attack, where triggers can be added to different places and can
successfully bypass NC. Thirdly, NC requires a significant number of testing sam-
ples to determine if a backdoor exists in a model or not. In real-world scenarios, such
a large number of benign inputs may not exist. Lastly, it is designed purely for input
space attacks, and it does not work for feature space attacks, such as using Nashville
and Gotham filters as triggers [28].
Fig. 4. Overview of ABS observations [28]. The left figure shows the feature surface of a
benign model. The middle figure shows the feature surface of a model with a backdoor. The
right figure shows a slice of surface for the backdoored model. The red dot in the middle figure
shows an state where the attack happens, and it corresponds to the dash line in the right figure.
ABS. ABS is built on top of two key observations. The first is that successful attacks
entail compromised neurons. In existing attacks, the backdoored model recognizes
the trigger as a strong feature of the target label to achieve a high attack success rate.
Such a feature is represented by a set of inner neurons, which are referred to as com-
promised neurons. The second observation is that compromised neurons represent a
subspace for the target label that cutcrosses the whole space. This idea is shown in
Figure 4. The feature space surface of a benign model (left figure in Figure 4) and
that of a backdoored model are noticeably different. For a backdoored model, there
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exists an cut of the surface that is significantly different from the benign model due to
the injected backdoor. As it works for all inputs, it will affect every prediction results
once it is activated. Thus, it will interact with the whole interface. The phenomenon
is demonstrated in the right figure of Figure 4. When a neuron value is assigned to
a special value, i.e., the trigger pixel value, the output will significantly deviate from
normal.
Based on these observations, Liu et al. [28] propose Artificial Brain Stimulation
(ABS). For any given input, ABS first predicts its label using the neural network.
Then, it enumerates all neurons and performs a brain stimulation process. Namely,
for each neuron, it tries to change its activation value to all possible values and si-
multaneously observes the value changes in the output. If there is one neuron whose
behavior is similar to the right figure in Figure 4, ABS treats it as a backdoor. To
reconstruct the backdoor trigger, ABS then performs a reverse engineering process,
which will try to find an input pattern that can strongly activate these compromised
neurons and trigger the attack.
ABS also introduces a new type of backdoor attacks, which is the feature space
attack. Namely, the trigger is no longer an input pattern (i.e., a region with specific
pixel values), but feature space patterns represent high-level features (e.g., an image
filter). However, this attack also has its own limitations. Firstly, it assumes one back-
door for each class. This may not hold in practice, and backdoors have been shown
to be dynamic [40]. Secondly, it currently enumerates neurons one by one, assuming
the presence of a strong correlation between one neuron and the backdoor behavior,
which may be hidden or overridden by more advanced attacks.
3.2 Post-deployment Techniques
In addition to static approaches functioning before models are deployed, there is also
work that monitors the model at runtime and determines if the model has a backdoor
and more importantly, if it has been triggered by an input or not. In this setting, the
defense or detection system can inspect individual inputs, offering a focused means
of directly reconstructing the trigger by inspecting the attack input.
Fig. 5. Overview of STRIP [13].
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STRIP. Gao et al. [13] propose STRong Intentional Perturbation (STRIP), a run-time
trojan attack detection system. The workflow of STRIP is shown in Figure 5. Firstly,
STRIP will perturb each input by adding benign samples drawn from the test samples
to obtain a list of perturbed inputs XP1 ,XP2 , ...,XPN . These inputs are the overlap of
an benign input and the given input. Next, it will feed all these inputs to the DNN
model. Note that if the input contains a trigger, it is highly likely that a majority of
the perturbed inputs will also yield predictions with the malicious output label result
(due to the existence of the trigger), whereas for a benign input, the results are closer
to random. As a result, STRIP only needs to examine every prediction result, and can
then make a judgement on if the input will trigger the backdoor or not.
STRIP can effectively detect backdoor models and inputs that trigger the back-
door if the trigger lies in the corners of the image or at least does not overly overlap
with the main contents. Such an example shown in Figure 5). However, if the trigger
does overlap with the contents (e.g., overlap with digits in Figure 5), the detection
will fail because the texture of the trigger will also be changed by the perturbations.
Salem et al.’s [40] proposed dynamic backdoor attack uses triggers that can be in the
middle of the image.
4 Applications of Backdoors
4.1 Watermarking
Digital Watermarking conceals information in a piece of media (e.g., sound, video,
or images) to enable a party to verify the authenticity or the originality of the me-
dia. This watermark, however, must also be resilient to tampering and other actors
seeking to subvert the legitimate piece of media.
Adi et al. [1] propose an IP protection method for DNNs by applying the back-
door to watermark DNNs. They present cryptographic modeling for both tasks of
watermarking and backdooring DNNs, and show that the former can be constructed
from the latter (through a cryptographic primitive known as commitment) in a black-
box manner. The definition of the backdoor attack that Adi et al. provided in a
cryptographic framework is as follows: Given a trigger set T and a labeling func-
tion TL, the backdoor shall be termed as b = (T,TL). The backdooring algorithm
Backdoor(O f ,b,M) is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm that receives
as input an oracle to f (ground-truth labeling function f : D→ L, where D is in-
put space, L is output space), the backdoor b and a model M, and outputs Mˆ. Mˆ is
considered backdoored if
Prx∈D¯\T [ f (x) 6=Classi f y(Mˆ,x)]≤ ε,
Prx∈T [TL(x) 6=Classi f y(Mˆ,x)]≤ ε,
(3)
where D¯ is the meaningful input, Classi f y(M,x) is a deterministic polynomial-time
algorithm that, for an input x ∈ D outputs a value M(x) ∈ L\{⊥}, and ⊥ is an un-
defined output label. This definition presents two ways to embed a backdoor. The
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first is that the backdoor is implanted into a pre-trained model. The second is the
adversary can train a new model from scratch.
A watermarking scheme can be split into three key components.
1. Generation of the secret “marking” key mk. This key will be embedded as the
watermark. A public verification key vk is also generated and will be used later
to detect the watermark. In watermarking via backdoors, the backdoor is the
marking key, while a commitment (the cryptographic primitive) used to generate
the backdoor is the verification key.
2. Embedding the watermark (a backdoor b) into a DNN model. Through poisioned
training data or retraining as previously described in Section 2.1, the watermark
(backdoor) can be embedded.
3. Verifying the presence of the watermark. Provided mk,vk, for a backdoor test
b = (T,TL). If ∀t(i) ∈ T : T (i)L 6= f (t(i)), proceed to the next step, otherwise the
verification fails. Despite the detection of the watermark, one must verify the
integrity of the commitment, i.e., if it was tampered or not. In the final step,
the accuracy of the algorithm is verified. For all i ∈ 1, ..,n, if more than ε|T |
elements from T does not satisfy Classi f y(t(i),M) = T (I)L , then the verification
fails, otherwise the commitment has been successfully verified.
Adi et al. [1] prove their method upholds the properties of:
• Functionality-preserving: the prediction accuracy of the model should not be
negatively influenced by the presence of the watermark.
• Unremovability: an adversary with full knowledge of the watermark generation
process should not be able to remove the watermark from the model.
• Unforgeability: an adversary with only the verification key should not be able to
demonstrate ownership of the marking key.
• non-trivial ownership: with knowledge of the watermark generation algorithm, a
third party should not be able to generate marker and verification key pairs, and
claim models for future models.
Li et al. [23], however, observe that the watermarking system proposed by Adi
et al. [1] makes the assumptions that only one backdoor (watermark) may be in-
serted into the model. For example, Salem et al. [40]’s Dynamic Backdoors contain
multiple backdoors. The existence of multiple backdoors would result in multiple
valid watermarks, and thus void the Unforgeability claim. The insertion of multiple
backdoors would also impact the Unremovability of the original backdoor, otherwise
termed as the persistence of the watermark. In response, Li et al. leverage two data
preprocessing techniques that use out-of-bound values and null-embedding to im-
prove the persistence of the watermark against other attackers and limit the effects of
retraining in the event that another backdoor is to be injected on top of the existing
backdoor. Li et al. also introduce wonder filters, a primitive to enable the embedding
of bit-sequences (from the marker key) into the model.
The largest hurdle to overcome in the application of the backdoor attack as a
means to watermark DNNs, is that neural networks are fundamentally designed to
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be tuned and trained incrementally. Li et al. propose a model piracy attack setting
whereby an adversary wants to stake its own ownership claims on the model, or
destroy the original owner’s claims. To defend against this attack, Li et al. design
a DNN watermarking system based on wonder filters that strongly authenticates
owners by embedding (into the DNN) a filter described by the owner’s private key.
Where Li et al’s work differs to Adi et al. is in the wonder filter W , which is a
two-dimensional digital filter that can be applied to any input image. This filter will
have 3 possible permutations for each pixel, transparent, positive change, or negative
change, with a majority of filter pixels being transparent. Thus, W is defined by the
position, size, and values of a 0/1 bit pattern block.
When Li et al. apply out-of-bound values, they translate the 0/1 bit pattern of W
as out-of-bound values in the input images. A set of training data is processed with
the filter. They then flip the values of the wonder filter to create an inverted wonder
filter W−. The inverted filter W− is then applied to the same set of training data pro-
cessed by W The set of images filtered by W are labeled as the target class label,
while the W− filtered data is labeled as the original class label before the data is used
to train the backdoored model. As for the normal and null embeddings approach,
the normal and null embeddings serve complementary objectives. The normal em-
bedding injects the desired marker into the model, while the null embedding “locks
down” the model, so no additional watermarks may be added.
Li et al’s process of watermarking the image is similar to Adi er al’s process, with
the same three key processes of: generating the secret “marking”, or in this instance,
the wonder filter W , embedding the watermark (and/or additionally locking down
the model), and finally, the process of verifying the watermark, by using the image
to compute W and an associated label. After applying W to a random set of images,
it is expected that an authentic watermark should yield a majority of the target class
label, instead of a random assortment of classes as expected from a random set of
images, without W .
Li et al. also provide a security analysis to prove that their approach can uphold
the requirements of reliability, no false positives, unforgeability, and persistence,
whereby Reliability describes that for given an input x, a poisoned input (x
⊕
W , or
x
⊕
W−), the backdoored DNNs will produce the predefined output in a deterministic
manner. No False Positives denotes that a verifier should not be capable of judging a
clean model as the watermarked model. unforgeability ensures that the watermark in-
jected on a DNN has a strong association with its owner, and Persistence guarantees
that the watermark embedded cannot be corrupted or removed by an adversary.
4.2 Adversarial Example Detection
In Gotta Catch [43], Shan et al. observe that the backdoor attack will alter the deci-
sion boundary of the DNN models. Following the injection of a backdoor, the deci-
sion boundary of the original clean model will mutate. The mutation will result in
triggers establishing shortcuts in the decision boundary of the backdoored model.
On the contrary, there is a common approach of adversarial attacks to find ad-
versarial examples; for example, universal adversarial attacks [35, 41], will try to
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iteratively search the whole dataset to find similar shortcuts to use as their universal
adversarial examples. Based on this observation, the shortcut created by a backdoor
can act as a trapdoor to capture the adversarial attacker’s optimization process, de-
tect, and/or recover from the adversarial attack [42]. The trapdoor implementation
uses techniques similar to those found in BadNets backdoor attacks [15]. The au-
thors define the trapdoor perturbation (the trigger) from multiple dimensions, e.g.,
mask ratio, size, pixel intensities, and relative locations.
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